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From Nomos to Hegung: 
 
Sovereignty and the Laws of War in Schmitt’s International Order 
Johanna Jacques* 
Carl Schmitt’s notion of nomos is commonly regarded as the international equivalent to the national 
sovereign’s decision on the exception. But can concrete spatial order alone turn a constellation of forces into 
an international order? This article looks at Schmit’s work The Nomos of the Earth and proposes that it is the 
process of bracketing war called Hegung which takes the place of the sovereign in the international order 
Schmitt describes. Beginning from an analysis of nomos, the ordering function of the presocratic concept 
moira is explored. It is argued that the process of Hegung, like moira, does not just achieve the containment 
of war, but constitutes the condition of possibility for plural order. 
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THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Schmitt’s definition of national sovereignty is well known: In relation to a unified 
order such as the state, Schmitt locates sovereignty in the role of a decision maker who is 
able to decide when to declare a state of exception and whom to identify as the state’s 
friends and enemies. In relation to a plural or international order, however, the location of 
this ‘we’, this self-reflexive, boundary-drawing element of order that Schmitt calls 
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sovereignty, presents a problem. How can order be unified and thus become an order, 
without thereby sacrificing the plurality of its constituents? As Rasch writes: 
 
 
. . . the paradox of . . . pluralism . . . [is that it requires] a structure that cannot itself be 
pluralistically relativized. Pluralism is not self-justifying; hence it requires allegiance. But 
to what is allegiance owed if pluralism is to flourish? 1 
 
When Schmitt turned his attention from state to international order some time after 
1936,2 it was not an option for him to propose universal norms in answer to this question. 
Already with his concept of national sovereignty, Schmitt had targeted a type of liberalism 
that ‘endorses internal plurality based on a nebulous, yet highly threatening, universal 
foundation’.3 
However, the question of international sovereignty did at first not arise. This was 
because Schmitt’s Groβraum theory of international order envisaged that a single 
hegemonic state (such as the German Reich) would regulate a regional order’s boundaries 
as the effective sovereign.4 Only when Schmitt wrote The Nomos of the Earth in the latter 
part of the 1940s, having revised his views on international order in favour of a 
1 W. Rasch, Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), 165. 
2 T. Zarmanian, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order: From Domestic to International’ (2006) 19 
 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 41, 54. 
 
3 Rasch, n 1 above, 158. 
4 See, for example, C. Schmitt, ‘The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for 
Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law’ in Writings on War 
(Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2011), 110-111. 
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plural order without the leadership of a single state, did it become apparent that he could 
no longer use the notion of sovereignty he had himself developed in Political Theology. As 
Giorgio Agamben notes in relation to The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt here ‘makes no 
allusion to his own definition of sovereignty’.5 The problem Schmitt encountered was that 
the European order had not only no single overarching sovereign who could decide when 
the order’s normality had been breached, but also no enemy in the sense in which states 
had enemies: ‘[A]n enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity 
of people confronts a similar collectivity’.6 While individual European states were going 
to war against other nations outside of Europe, Europe as a whole had neither such agency 
nor such opponents. Its ‘outside’ was (from the European point of view) not a defined 
entity, but simply undistinguished exteriority.7 This meant that Schmitt could not refer to 
a constitutive outside for the foundation of international order in the same way in which he 
had done for state order. Nor did he think that the order of the jus publicum Europaeum 
was merely a loose arrangement based on the free agreement of the participating states.8 
Where, then, was the sovereign element of international order? 
5 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 
36. 
6 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
 
28. 
 
7 If one is to rely on exteriority, this must be in the form of something. Schmitt thus writes that the enemy ‘is 
our own question brought into shape’. C. Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary  on the 
Concept of the Political (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007), 85, translation amended, emphasis added. 
8 C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: 
 
Telos Press Publishing, 2003), 147-148 and 166. 
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To solve this problem, Schmitt turned to nomos, or concrete spatial order. Already 
in 1934, Schmitt had contemplated the meaning of the phrase nomos basileus (nomos the 
king).9 In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt then considered at length the meaning of nomos 
as ‘ruler’.10 He appeared to think that there existed a spatially determined ‘balance’, 
‘tension’, or ‘equilibrium’ between European states that would regulate European order.11 
However, the idea of nomos as sovereign leaves a number of questions unanswered. 
For example, how could concrete spatial order ‘as a whole’, as Schmitt claims, decide on 
its own normality, when he also maintains that there was no ‘centralized location’ from 
which such a decision might have issued?12 Where was the point from which a situation 
could be assessed as having become exceptional, and to which order might have withdrawn 
to oppose the change it had itself produced? Where, in other words, was the point at which 
order became a self-reflexive ‘we’? 
This article reads Schmitt against his own expressed opinion, and against those of 
his commentators who also present nomos as the international equivalent to the national 
sovereign,13 by questioning the ability of nomos to have constituted the sovereign 
 
9 ‘One can speak of a true Nomos as true king only if Nomos means precisely the concept of Recht 
encompassing a concrete order and Gemeinschaft’. C. Schmitt, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought 
(Westport: Praeger, 2004), 50-51. 
10 Schmitt, n 8 above, 72-76. 
11 ibid, various. 
12 ibid, 188. 
13 Hooker, for example, writes that nomos is the ‘”solution” to the problem of pluralism’ on the 
international level equivalent to national sovereignty, while Bosteels finds the need for an international 
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element of international order. It suggests that the process of bracketing war that Schmitt 
calls Hegung took on this role in the order of the jus publicum Europaeum, setting out how 
the laws of war drew a boundary not just around conflict, but also around an order in which 
conflict assumed the ordering function of law. 
 
NOMOS 
 
Schmitt had turned to concrete order long before The Nomos of the Earth. He began to 
revise his own brand of decisionism by discussing the institutional guarantees of rights in 
his 1928 work Constitutional Theory. In the 1934 preface to the 2nd edition of Political 
Theology, he then introduced a new type of legal thinking: ‘institutional legal thinking’.14 
With this concept Schmitt had hoped to capture the concretely ‘stable content’15 of legal 
 
sovereign eliminated by ‘the supposition of an all-encompassing objective nomos of the earth’. Agamben 
also sees a direct relation between nomos and sovereignty, but does not elaborate further. Ojakangas more 
specifically regards the act of land appropriation that is part of nomos as providing access to an outside that 
is comparable to the sovereign decision or the enemy. However, he does not consider that Europe as a whole 
could hardly be said to have acted to appropriate land outside of its borders. W. Hooker, Carl Schmitt's 
International Thought: Order and Orientation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
25. B. Bosteels, ‘The Obscure Subject: Sovereignty and Geopolitics in Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos of the 
Earth’ (2005) 104:2 South Atlantic Quarterly, 295, 304. Agamben, n 5 above. M. Ojakangas, ‘“Existentially 
Something Other and Strange:” On Carl Schmitt’s Political Philosophy of Concrete Life’ in 
S. Hänninen and J. Vähämäki (eds.), Displacement of Politics (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2000) 65, 
70-71. 
14 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Massachusetts and 
 
London: The MIT Press, 1985) 2. 
 
15 ibid, 3. 
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rules that could not be generated by universal, unchanging laws, by bureaucratic 
processes that lacked personal input, or by arbitrary decisions. 
In the same year, and thus some time before turning to the international order of the 
jus publicum Europaeum and its nomos, Schmitt expanded on this idea in On the Three 
Types of Juristic Thought, where he proposed ‘concrete order thinking’ as a way to think 
about the origin of law preferable to both normativism and decisionism. The question that 
plagued Schmitt, who continued to be driven by the aim to prove Kelsen wrong, was how 
to account for the particular nature of any one legal order over time without referring to 
abstract norms purged of concrete social elements. ‘Schmitt’,  Schwab writes, ‘realized as 
early as 1928 that his purely decisionist approach was insufficient [for this purpose], and 
therefore he began then to explore the possibilities of establishing a legal system based on 
concrete orders’.16 In doing so, one of Schmitt’s assumptions, however, remained 
unchanged from his decisionist writings. As in Political Theology,17 he wrote in On the 
Three Types of Juristic Thought that norms could not exist without a conception of what 
was normal as well as the concretely existing state of such normality.18 The difference was 
that Schmitt now came to see normality as defined by concrete social order in the form of 
institutions such as the estates or the family, rather than by the potentially arbitrary decision 
of a sovereign.19 
 
 
16 G. Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt 
between 1921 and 1936 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970) 155, footnote omitted. 
17 Schmitt, n 14 above, 13. 
18 Schmitt, n 9 above, 55. 
19 ibid, 56. 
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However, this did not mean that the decision had now become redundant for 
Schmitt. Rather than seeing the turn from the decision to concrete order as a turn away 
from the decision, one should see it as a shift in emphasis from the decision itself to its 
legitimacy, which Schmitt now located in concrete order. While this emphasis may have 
been new, the concern with legitimacy was not. As Zarmanian points out, even in his purely 
decisionistic days Schmitt had not been a formalist. Only if the decision correlated with the 
underlying order could it produce stability, and was thus legitimate: ‘The ability of a 
decision to produce legal order does not depend on its content or form; rather, the rightness 
of the content and the form of the decision are deduced from their ability to produce a legal 
order’.20 
There is hence little evidence to suggest that Schmitt thought that an order could 
function without a decisional element merely because its nature was determined by 
concrete order. On the contrary, Schmitt warned that the pluralism associated with an order 
based on social institutions21 needed to be tempered with the unifying actions of a 
 
 
20 Zarmanian, n 2 above, 50. 
21 Pluralism in the sense that different orders give rise to different rules, and different institutional affiliations 
to different entitlements. Schmitt, n 14 above, 49. It is only too clear what possibilities concrete order thinking 
presented for the Nazis, who sought to establish social and legal hierarchies on the basis of participation in 
certain institutions, thereby denying those excluded from these institutions the protection of their individual 
rights under law. See, for example, Schwab, n 16 above, 116 and 124. Carty points out in this respect that 
Schmitt’s notion of concrete order thinking was aimed at what Schmitt regarded as ‘the Jewish influence’ on 
legal thought, namely an abstract normativism divorced from any concrete rootedness in land. A. Carty, ‘Carl 
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International Legal Order Between 1933 and 1945’ (2001) 14 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 25, 36-37. 
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sovereign, if un-coordinated, ‘feudal-corporate growth’22 were to be prevented. Schmitt 
also saw the need for a leader in relation to each individual institution; a leader who would 
safeguard the order of the institution by arbitrating conflicts in accordance with its notion 
of normality, and to whom allegiance would be shown. 
By the time Schmitt turned to the concept of nomos as spatial order in the latter 
stages of the Second World War,23 such a leader figure had, however, disappeared from his 
account of order. Schmitt begins The Nomos of the Earth by stating that nomos refers to 
‘an original, constitutive act of spatial ordering’.24 Land is taken, distributed and used for 
human production, each epoch in world history having developed its own specific way of 
apportioning physical space. The apportionment may be based on the land’s natural 
boundaries or the measure of its productive yield, on nomadic land usage, or the traditional 
divisions of land in settled communities. In all cases, these processes of apportionment 
bring into being a structured space, from the ‘inner measure’ of which ‘all subsequent 
regulations of a written or unwritten kind derive their power’.25 Nomos is thus both process 
and ‘spatial structure’, both ‘source’ and that which flows from it.26 The ‘original, 
constitutive act of spatial ordering’, whether understood as the dispensation by 
 
22  Schmitt, n 14 above, 3. 
23 Despite this change, it is clear that the concept presents a continuation of Schmitt’s thinking on concrete 
order, to which it is linked through the intervening concept of Großraum. The link is established by the 
description of law’s basis as a ‘völkisch order of life and community’, in which the concept of Volk, i.e. the 
people, combines connotations of race and space. See Schmitt, n 9 above, 93 and Schmitt, n 4 above, 102. 
24 Schmitt, n 8 above, 78. 
25 ibid, 78. 
26 ibid, 186 and 48. Also see ibid, 72, where Schmitt refers to nomos as ‘origin’ and ‘archetype’. 
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nature of her goods or the taking and distribution of land by men, brings into being a 
space structured by these acts. 
The question is whether this space can constitute an order without an additional 
sovereign, boundary-drawing, element. In the absence of a sovereign, how does an order 
distinguish its own particular normality from the different nomoi that are characteristic of 
other ways of life? Vismann suggests in this respect that an order constituted by nomos – 
what she calls a ‘zone’ – does not need a sovereign who stands on the limit between order 
and disorder, excluding the latter from the former: ‘Zone and line are both border- notions. 
The line is either a purely legal notion, such as the papal demarcation line, or the effect of 
precise geography. A zonal order, however, comes from filling in, not from exclusion’.27 
There are, however, two problems with this reading. The first is that Vismann’s 
notion of ‘filling in’ presumes precisely that which Schmitt rejects, namely space as a 
universal form of cognition, abstract and empty space waiting to be filled in. For Schmitt, 
space does not pre-exist the action that establishes its structure. Already in 1939, Schmitt 
had bemoaned the use of ‘space theory’ by legal positivists, writing: ‘In spite of its name, 
this [use of space theory] assumed the opposite of a concrete conception of space and 
regarded country, soil, territory, and state territory as a “space” in the sense of an empty 
dimension of planes and depths with linear borders’.28 This concern with the definition of 
 
 
 
 
27 C. Vismann, ‘Starting from Scratch: Concepts of Order in No Man's Land’ in B. Hüppauf (ed.), War, 
Violence and the Modern Condition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997) 60. 
28 Schmitt, n 4 above, 80, footnote omitted. 
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space continued into Schmitt’s work on nomos and beyond,29 which means that any 
analysis of nomos must take into account the fact that for Schmitt, spatial order comes into 
being not after, but at the same time as the space it creates. Therefore, there was no ‘filling 
in’ to speak of. 
The second problem relates to the difference between, on the one hand, structures 
that may be determined by certain processes, and on the other hand, an order that requires 
a self-reflexive element. While Vismann is right to point to Schmitt’s view of order as 
concretely determined,30 the scope of this determination only includes the order’s nature, 
not its boundary. After all, the way in which land is divided in one place may differ from 
divisions elsewhere, without there being an order that regulates and protects itself. A fence 
erected to divide two parcels of land establishes a nomos between them. Land 
 
29 For example, in 1951, one year after the publication of The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt writes in the 
course of analysing the German word for ‘space’ (Raum): ‘”Space” . . . is a world, and this world is not an 
empty space and is also not in an empty space, but our space is a world filled with the tension of diverse 
elements’. C. Schmitt, ‘Raum und Rom - Zur Phonetik des Wortes Raum’ in Staat, Groβraum, Nomos: 
Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995) 492-493. 
30 Schmitt thus questions the distinction between nomos (as physis) and law (as logos), a distinction he 
 
regards as artificial and ideologically motivated. See, for example, C. Schmitt, ‘Nomos - Nahme - Name’ in 
Staat, Groβraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995) 578. 
Rather than seeing nomos as historically preceding and eventually overcome by political formations and legal 
rules, and thus as distinct from law conceived as positive norm or agreement, Schmitt regards not only all 
law, but also political, religious and social order as reflecting the constitutive order of nomos: ‘Nomos is the 
measure by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, 
and religious order determined by this process. Here, measure, order, and form constitute a spatially concrete 
unity’. Schmitt, n 8 above, 70. 
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becomes ordered, but there is no order as an entity unless the fence also unifies what it 
divides. This happens when a point is found from which the division can be recognised and 
regulated as such. For national order, this is the state. For an international order in which 
there is no arbitrator of conflicts, and in which each state preserves its sovereign right to 
go to war (and thus its right to reject precisely any possible consensus on the basis of which 
conflict could be settled), this unifying element is missing. 
In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt attempts to circumvent this problem by relying 
on the work of Jost Trier, a German linguist and contemporary of Schmitt. He uses Trier 
to argue that the word nomos belongs to a group of ‘fence-words’ (Zaunwort) that includes 
Hegung. The latter is a term that has variously been translated as ‘enclosure’, ‘bracketing’ 
or ‘containment’. Schmitt then refers to the significance of the bracketing of space 
(Hegungen im räumlichen Sinne), in particular the bracketing of war, for attaining a state 
of law (Recht) and peace, suggesting that etymological analysis shows the effects of 
Hegung and nomos to be interchangeable. He ends by quoting Trier as saying that ‘each 
nomos is what it is within its own bounds’.31 
This passage can be read in two ways. The first reading places nomos at the helm 
of international order, its bracketing function analogous to that of Hegung. If this reading 
were correct, then Schmitt would need to be regarded as glossing over the problematic he 
himself recognises in other contexts, namely that a structure that has arisen from the 
delimitation of elements, and that represents the tension between these elements, cannot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Schmitt, n 8 above, 75, translation amended. 
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also be its own delimitation.32 To point to the mere fact of a difference between Europe 
and the rest of the world – a difference in their respective concrete orders or nomoi – is not 
sufficient in this respect, as there was no point at which this difference was established and 
regulated. For example, when Schmitt writes that the free spaces of the New World and the 
unlimited warfare that took place there contributed to the successful limitation of war 
between European states, this does not explain how the line between Europe and the New 
World was drawn and by what means this difference in ‘tension’ between inside and 
outside was regulated.33 
The second reading is to see nomos as the legitimising source of legal order, namely 
an order in which the laws of war (Hegung) reflect the underlying concrete order in a 
similar way to national laws. Indeed, immediately before this paragraph, Schmitt describes 
nomos as ‘the full immediacy of a legal power not mediated by laws; . . . a 
 
32 See, for example, Schmitt’s reflections on the German word for ‘space’, Raum. Schmitt writes that although 
this word consists of the tension between its vowels, it also needs its consonants in order to begin with an 
‘active approach’ and end by ‘merging with the horizon’. Schmitt, n 29 above, 491. This understanding of 
nomos as the particular characteristics of a legal order (but not the order itself) had already been adopted in 
Schmitt’s time. An early commentator on The Nomos of the Earth accordingly writes that nomos denotes 
‘the sense of ownership culture within the conquered area’. H. Schmidt, ‘Der Nomosbegriff bei Carl Schmitt’ 
(1963) 2 Der Staat 81, 104, emphasis added. 
33 Schmitt claims that ‘[t]he designation of a conflict zone outside of Europe contributed . . . to the 
 
bracketing of European wars, which is its meaning and its justification in international law’. Schmitt, n 8 
above, 97-98. He appears to suggest that the order of limited war in Europe could only be maintained by 
externalising unlimited conflict to the space beyond the amity lines: ‘Everything that occurred “beyond the 
line” remained outside the legal, moral, and political values recognized on this side of the line. This was a 
tremendous exoneration of the internal European problematic’. Schmitt, n 8 above, 94. 
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constitutive historical event – an act of legitimacy, whereby the legality of a mere law first 
is made meaningful’.34 While this reading seems intuitively right – after all, it would 
broadly follow the historical narrative of European order as an order in which states’ mutual 
recognition led to the limitation of war between them – it still leaves unanswered the 
question of sovereignty. If nomos or concrete spatial order provided the legitimacy for law, 
who decided what this nomos was, precisely, and which changes constituted a threat to its 
normality? How was order distinguished from a merely momentary and purposeless 
constellation of forces that could always be otherwise? 
To answer these questions, a third reading will be proposed. This reading sees the 
international order not as a spatial or legal order, but as an order of war. It argues that war 
took on the role of regulating conflict within the order, while law – the laws of war – took 
on the role of the sovereign, determining the point at which war was no longer able to 
successfully regulate conflict and therefore needed to be suspended. This reversal of roles 
makes sense when one considers the following: The distinction between ‘inside and 
outside, peace and war’,35 which for Schmitt divided the sovereign state from its 
environment and thus ensured the existence of both, was in the case of the jus publicum 
Europeaum itself internal to the international order. This meant that sovereignty was no 
longer a matter of expelling war to the order’s exterior to create a peaceful legal order 
within, but of managing war in such a way as to ensure its successful co-existence with 
peace on the order’s inside. War still needed to be distinct from peace, and it still needed 
 
 
34 ibid, 73. 
35 C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1963) 11. 
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to be a continuous possibility if order were to exist. The sovereign element therefore needed 
to ensure that each war could be followed by peace and each peace could be followed by 
another war, keeping either one from engulfing the other. The gesture of sovereignty 
therefore was no longer one of expulsion, of pointing to the other or the outside, but of 
inclusion, of gathering two opposed states into a non-unified union. It was this inclusion 
that the process of bracketing war called Hegung managed to achieve. 
 
 
MOIRA 
 
According to the cosmology of Anaximander, formless, indefinite substance was separated 
into the elements (earth, water, air, fire) at the beginning of the world, when each acquired 
its own region: 
 
 
The separation of the elements into their several regions was caused by the ‘eternal motion’ 
– which perhaps we should conceive as a ‘whirling’ motion (dίnh) of the whole universe, 
which sifts out the opposites from the primary, indiscriminate or ‘limitless’ mixture, in 
which they will again be all merged and confused when they perish into that from which 
they arose.36 
 
 
This separation resulted in an order that was thought to be juridical in the sense that 
the disturbance of the ‘equal balance’ (δίκη or ‘justice’) between the opposing elements, 
the ‘predominance of one element over another’,37 was perceived as an 
36 F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation  (New 
York: Harper, 1957) 9, footnote omitted. 
37 J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1930) 54, n 1. 
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injustice: ‘The warm commits “injustice” in summer, the cold in winter’.38 The elements 
were ‘at perpetual war with one another, each seeking to encroach upon the domain of its 
antagonist’,39 and could only be kept from merging with each other by  what Anaximander 
describes as a limitation, imposed on each element in the ongoing process of separation 
from the formless substance.40 Without such a limitation, their possible infinity would have 
likely meant the expansion of one element at the expense of all the others.41 
Cornford traces this limitation of the elements to the term moira in Homer and 
Hesiod.42 Moira first denoted someone’s part or allotted portion,43 before then becoming 
the representation of Fate. Fate was not a personified power with a purpose and will; she 
was ‘the blind, automatic force which leaves their [men’s, the Gods’] purposes and wills 
free play within their own legitimate spheres, but recoils in certain vengeance upon them 
the moment that they cross her boundaries’.44 
As soon as the process of dividing and dispensing the universe was attributed to a 
personal god, i.e., a sovereign, it became the process of legislating. Moira turned into 
nomos, Fate into law.45 As law, nomos reflected an order in which each element had its 
 
38 ibid, 57-58. 
39 Cornford, n 36 above, 9. 
40 Burnet, n 37 above, 58. 
41 ibid, 53. 
42 Cornford, n 36 above, 12. 
43 ibid, 16. 
44 ibid, 20-21. 
45 ibid, 28. 
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proper place. Derivatives of nomos thus denote the shepherd’s allotted pasture, as well as 
‘dwelling place’, ‘quarters’ and ‘range’; the term ‘law-abiding’ ‘has the older sense of 
“quartered” or “dwelling” in a country, which is, as it were, the legitimate range of its 
inhabitants’.46 In this way nomos became associated with that which is proper to a certain 
place, with ‘normal behaviour prescribed and enjoined within a given province, and so 
custom’.47 While moira had been ‘limiting and forbidding’, ‘always static, a system  rather 
than a force, lean[ing] toward the negative’,48 nomos was ‘dynamic and incline[d] to the 
positive’.49 
The question is what precise role moira assumed in this ordering process, and 
whether it should really be seen as merely the negative aspect of the normal, the limit that 
confined each part of normality to its proper place. Judging from the comments of those 
writing on the role of the state form in Schmitt’s international order, the answer should be 
‘yes’. In this respect, it is commonly assumed that by limiting each state to a fixed territory 
(restricting its extension within the European order without thereby restricting its particular 
internal normality), the state form acted as the hinge by which normality (unity) was 
successfully combined with a plurality of elements (difference). Schmitt himself thus 
describes the state as the sole agency of order.50 In commenting on Schmitt, 
 
 
 
46 ibid, 30, footnote omitted. 
47 ibid, 34. 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid. 
50 ‘[T]he sovereign, European, territorial state . . . constituted the only ordering institution at this time . . . 
the state was the spatially concrete, historical, organizational form of this epoch, which, at least on 
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Rasch calls the state form ‘the linchpin that holds together both the “top-down” 
homogeneity of the state and the heterogeneity of a structured plurality of states that 
guarantees the space of legitimate politics’.51 Zarmanian also adopts this understanding, 
describing the state as ‘[t]he cornerstone of the new nomos’,52 and seems to echo 
Anaximander when he stresses the importance of limiting an order’s elements: ‘Order can 
be created through the neutralization of conflicts among contrasting groups only to the 
extent that such groups of individuals are finite. Infinity cannot be ordered: either it leads 
to unity, and therefore there is no need for an order, or it excludes the possibility of 
discriminating between friend and enemy’.53 Whitman, finally, attributes the limitation of 
warfare in the eighteenth century entirely to the status of war as a legitimate prerogative of 
state sovereignty,54 suggesting that without such a prerogative, the containment of war 
would have been impossible. 
However, this picture begins to change when one considers that it was war that in 
presocratic cosmology characterised the process of ordering even before the elements had 
fully separated from the indefinite substance. Thus, what was ‘eternal motion’ for 
Anaximander had previously been conceived as a process of ‘division, repulsion, 
 
 
 
European soil, had become the agency of progress in the sense of increasing the rationalization and the 
bracketing of war’. Schmitt, n 8 above, 148-149. Also see ibid, 128-129. 
51 W. Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents (London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004) 37. 
52 Zarmanian, n 2 above, 63. 
53 ibid, 55. 
54 J. Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2012) 249. 
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“strife”’.55 Similarly, while in the Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt’s account of nomos begins 
with existing political units that divide and distribute land between them,56 this process of 
division should be recognised for the violence it inevitably involved. In Europe, the 
‘taking’ of new land encountered resistance from others even before these others were fully 
established states. Given this early occurrence of conflict in the process of spatial ordering, 
it may therefore be more accurate to describe the limitation imposed on the elements of 
order as a limitation placed on war, rather than on the individual elements themselves. 
Such a view is supported by Hegel’s account of recognition, in which the 
emergence and mutual recognition of two parties is not only a violent process, but also a 
process whose success depends on the limitation of this violence. According to Hegel, the 
opponents in the fight for recognition fight each other to the death. However, the winner 
realises that he can only achieve his own freedom through that of the opponent. The latter’s 
life must be spared if the winner is to gain freedom not only from him, but in his eyes, as 
when he is killed, ‘the two do not reciprocally give and receive one another back from each 
other consciously, but leave each other free only indifferently, like things’.57 This 
realisation is not a sudden insight, but a lesson the winner learns from previous encounters, 
in which the opponent was killed. The winner begins to understand that his freedom to 
impose his will upon another depends on the recognition of this freedom by the other, who 
thereby confirms that what happened was not simply the unfolding of 
 
 
55 Cornford, n 36 above, 18. 
56 See, for example, Schmitt, n 8 above, 45-46 and 70. 
57 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 144 [§188]. 
Page 19 of 36  
reason or destiny, but of will. Such recognition, however, is only then truly given when the 
decision is challenged as part of a disagreement so radical as to make impossible its 
reasoned resolution. As Derrida observes in relation to both Hegel and Schmitt: ‘The 
question [by which the other challenges me] is no longer a theoretical question, a question 
of knowledge or of recognition, but first of all, like recognition in Hegel, a calling into 
question, an act of war’.58 
In this way, the opponents are united by the emerging acknowledgement of their 
dependence on each other59 at the very time at which they seek to assert their 
 
58 J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship (London and New York: Verso, 1997) 162. The potential downside of 
seeing recognition as dependent on such a violent challenge is that one might conclude, as Schmitt appears 
to do, that without the successful staging of such a challenge, the other does not present a source of 
recognition and therefore does not warrant protection. ‘Who can I ever recognise as my enemy? Obviously 
only he who can put me into question’. C. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus: Erfahrungen aus der Zeit 1945/47 
(Köln: Greven Verlag, 1950) 89. This leads to the ironic situation where warfare is limited only in relation 
to those already able to defend themselves. Thus, even though Schmitt initially refers to the fact that Poland 
‘had not reached the organizational level of modern European states’ as a reason why its territory was 
appropriated by neighbouring states in the 18th century, he immediately adds the following explanation of 
why this level of organisation was relevant: ‘It [Poland] did not have the power to launch a defensive state 
war to prevent the divisions and land-appropriations of Polish soil by neighboring states (1792, 1793, 1795)’. 
Schmitt, n 8 above, 166. 
59 Not to be confused with the necessity that underlies the social contract. On the contrary, Hegel writes, 
 
‘since this [true freedom] consists in my identity with the other, I am only truly free when the other is also 
free and is recognized by me as free. This freedom of one in the other unites men in an inward manner, 
whereas needs and necessity bring them together only externally’. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind: Being 
Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) 171 
[§431]. 
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independence. According to Pippin, ‘it is thus clear that his [Hegel’s] ethical thought means 
to appeal at bottom to an inescapable, binding form of human dependence which when 
properly (or normatively) acknowledged becomes itself the means for the achievement of 
a collective form of independence’.60 
The acknowledgment of mutual dependence by states during the formation of 
European spatial order may seemingly contradict Schmitt’s definition of the political as the 
friend-enemy distinction. Prozorov, for example, describes this distinction as an act that 
cuts the knot of inter-dependence and brings into being self and other in one stroke.61 
However, it should be remembered that for Schmitt, the enemy (rather than the foe) is 
always already the recognised enemy, which locates the friend-enemy distinction within 
an established European order and thus after the successful conclusion of the process of 
recognition. The decision to lay down one’s weapon when one has won, rather than to  kill 
the opponent, is a general decision that precedes the designation of individual others as 
either friends or enemies. While recognition is concerned with an order’s unity, the friend-
enemy distinction is concerned with its plurality.62 
60 R. B. Pippin, Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 196. 
61   S.  Prozorov,  ‘The  Ethos  of  Insecure  Life:  Reading  Carl  Schmitt's  Existential  Decisionism  as  a 
 
Foucauldian Ethics’ in L. Odysseos and F. Petito (eds), The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: 
Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order (London and New York: Routledge, 2007) 222, 234. 
Lindahl terms it ‘one fell swoop’. H. Lindahl, ‘The Opening: Alegality and Political Agonism’ in 
A. Schaap (ed.), Law and Agonistic Politics (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) 57, 59. 
 
62 Similarly, the question of the legal enforceability of the laws of war should be seen as separate from their 
earlier role in establishing the order. Schmitt thus writes: ‘a normative regulation – if it is conceived to be a 
factual state of affairs, rather than just a collection of value judgements and general clauses – is juridically 
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The difficulty with using Hegel’s account of recognition, however, is that the unity 
Hegel has in mind does not coincide with the unity of the order of the jus publicum 
Europaeum. For Schmitt, as for Hegel, limiting conflict guarantees the survival of both 
opponents. But while for Hegel the parties’ differences are ultimately sublated and the fight 
for life or death reveals itself as having been a mere step in a continuously progressing 
history, for Schmitt the survival of the parties means the guaranteed possibility of future 
wars, of future radical disagreements. This distinguishes the ‘neutralisation’ of war 
between European states from the neutralisation of conflict within each nation state: State 
sovereigns did not tolerate internal violence, using law to resolve the conflicts that arose 
between citizens. The European laws of war, on the other hand, made possible and 
protected internal conflict as war, not debate, legal argument or any other non-violent 
means of dispute resolution. 
Schmitt thus circumvents the critique that Düttmann sets out in relation to liberal 
theories of order that are based on Hegel’s account of recognition. These, he writes, 
presuppose the very same element in the process of recognition that is yet to be established 
by it, and thus circulate within ‘a closed horizon, in which the other ultimately is not 
recognised, but in his identity re-cognised [wiedererkannt] as this or that other’.63 What 
Düttmann criticises in these theories is that recognition causes difference 
 
impossible. . . . they [the concepts of bracketed war] became legalized between states only when the 
belligerent states – both internally and externally – adhered to them in equal measure, i.e., when their 
domestic and foreign policy concepts of regularity and irregularity, legality and illegality, became 
substantively congruent or at least more or less homogenous in structure’. Schmitt, n 7 above, 35-36. 
63 A. G. Düttmann, Zwischen den Kulturen: Spannungen im Kampf um Anerkennung (Frankfurt am Main: 
 
Suhrkamp, 1997) 144. 
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to vanish at the very moment in which the recognised ought to assert himself in his 
difference. In contrast, Schmitt’s plural order is neither based on unity nor aspires to unity. 
The laws of war ensure the continuing existence of difference not only by preventing the 
eradication of the other, but also by preventing the enforcement of a conception of right on 
him, whether consensus-based or otherwise. The order’s only necessary requirement, its 
only ‘unity’, is that no single version of truth may be taken as necessary. Order is based on 
the realisation that the necessity to eradicate difference has ceased to exist, and that in the 
absence of such necessity, the possibility to eradicate difference no longer confers an 
advantage. 
Like sovereignty on the national level, for Schmitt the process of bracketing war is 
therefore ‘simultaneously the vehicle for peace and war, for life and death’,64 just that here, 
peace and war are both internal characteristics of order. It is the laws of war, rather than 
the state form, which should thus be described as a hinge for plural order in which radical 
disagreements remain as much a possibility as peace. In Düttmann’s terms, one might say 
that each time war breaks out in such an order and remains limited, the order is reconfirmed 
at the very same time as it is disturbed or ‘interrupted’ by war: 
 
 
[O]rder65 is not the solid ground of recognition, which gives the recognising and the 
recognised entities existence. It is a relation, a belonging together of the incompatible, 
which does not let itself be grasped together and which one therefore cannot grasp as 
 
 
64 P. W. Kahn, ‘Imagining Warfare’ (2013) 24:1 European Journal of International Law 199, 204. 
65 Düttmann here writes of das Anerkennen [the process of recognition], but means the order established 
through recognition. 
Page 23 of 36  
unity; it is a relation of restraint, a separating, un-seemly belongingness, which interrupts 
its own unity.66 
 
To return to presocratic cosmology, if moira made an order possible in which a 
‘brotherhood’ of elements continuously fought each other, it must have been concerned 
with the limitation of war rather than with the limitation of the elements. Such wars were 
represented by ‘things’, instances of war, which, according to Anaximander, came into 
being when elements overstepped their established boundaries, encroaching on another’s 
territory. Things were made up of several elements, but they did not exist permanently, as 
eventually each part of a thing had to return to its element.67 ‘Into that from which things 
take their rise they pass away once more, as is ordained, for they make reparation and 
satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the ordering of time’.68 It was 
moira that ensured this return – not by ordaining that the elements had to stay within their 
boundaries (if it had done so, wars would not have existed), but that if the elements did 
transgress their boundaries, they did so while leaving the overall order intact. As Russell 
writes: ‘The thought which Anaximander is expressing seems to be this: there should be a 
certain proportion of fire, of earth, and of water in the world, but each element (perceived 
as a god) is perpetually attempting to enlarge its empire. But there is a kind of necessity or 
natural law which perpetually redresses that balance’.69 As natural law, moira ordained 
 
66 Düttmann, n 63 above, 52. 
67 Cornford, n 36 above, 8. 
68 Anaximander, quoted in B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 
2009) 31. 
69 Russell, n 68 above, 31. 
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what was both necessary and just, without thereby bringing into being either a realm of 
necessity or implementing a substantive vision of justice. By limiting war, it ensured that 
the balance of the order was open to negotiation, but that the existence of each element, 
and thus the plural nature of the overall order, was never itself under threat. In this order, a 
final notion of justice, of summer as against winter, hot against cold, was continuously 
postponed, remaining to be worked out in yet another clash of forces. 
 
 
HEGUNG 
 
Schmitt calls the process of limiting war Hegung, a term that would perhaps pass as 
unremarkable were it not for Schmitt’s reference to its spatial connotations and his attempt 
to associate these with nomos. Schmitt clearly sees the significance of limiting war for the 
European order, but chooses to ascribe its effects to nomos. The concept of Hegung, 
however, deserves an analysis of its own. 
The word Hegung – still reflected by the current German phrase hegen und pflegen, 
perhaps best translated as ‘to hold and cherish’ – refers to the delimitation or containment 
of something, initially space, in order to protect it from adverse outside influences. The 
term is still mainly used in its verbal form hegen, of which the English form is given in the 
Grimms’ dictionary as the verb ‘hedge’.70 Primarily, therefore, Hegung refers to a process 
of containing something, not the container or enclosure itself. Gönnenwein and Weizsäcker 
accordingly list the verbal meaning of Hegung before its 
70 J. and W. Grimm, ‘Hegen’ in Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1854-1961) vol. 10, 
777. Jacob Grimm, a jurist himself, adopted Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s genetic principle both in his work 
on language and on law. See R. Schmidt-Wiegand, Jacob Grimm und das Genetische Prinzip in 
Rechtswissenschaft und Philologie (Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1987). 
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meaning as the bracketed space itself, i.e., the space won through the erection of fencing 
that is Hegung.71 
Given its aim of protection, it follows that the process of Hegung is used whenever 
something is vulnerable, if not altogether precious, therefore warranting such protection. 
This is true for forestry, where it is young trees that become the object of Hegung, and also 
for hunting, where Hegezeit means close season, the time in which animals breed or may 
not be hunted for other reasons.72 Schmitt, however, uses the term Hegung to mean the 
bracketing of intra-European war through the laws of war, die Hegung des Krieges. This 
corresponds to a brief entry in Grimms’ dictionary, where Hegung is given as the spatial 
delimitation and Einfriedung of the knightly battlefield.73 However, if Einfriedung (or 
Befriedung) means the protection of a space from assaults by the enemy and thus its 
pacification,74 then from what does the battle itself need to be protected, given it already 
takes place with the enemy? How would the delimitation of the battlefield achieve 
pacification, other than in the obvious sense of a conflict  coming to an end there (the 
Grimms appropriately refer to the Friedhof or ‘graveyard’ as a gehegter place)?75 
 
71 O. Gönnenwein and W. Weizsäcker, ‘Hegung’ in Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch: Wörterbuch der älteren 
deutschen Rechtssprache (H. A. d. Wissenschaften, Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1953- 
1960) vol. 5, 557-558. 
72 Grimm and Grimm, n 70 above, vol. 10, 784. 
73  ibid, vol. 10, 777. 
74  ibid, vol. 1, 1274. 
75 ibid, vol. 10, 777. Cf. Kant’s reference at the beginning of his essay To Perpetual Peace to the inscription 
‘perpetual peace’ on a Dutch shopkeeper’s sign on which a graveyard had been painted: ‘Whether this 
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A possible answer to these questions emerges under the rubric of ‘containment’: 
Perhaps it is not war that needs to be protected, but the rest of society that needs to be 
protected from war. After all, on the national level it was the sovereign who protected the 
order from its enemies. If on the international level law took on the role of the sovereign, 
then it might have been law that protected the international order from war. One could in 
this respect point to another word that developed from the verb hegen, namely the adjective 
heikel, which meant and still means ‘sensitive’. At first, heikel was used in the sense of a 
person being brought up in a careful manner (as in häckel), being ‘delicate’, ‘fastidious’76 
and ‘thorough’,77 but today it has the sense of a delicate matter that demands handling with 
care, a matter which, if handled in the wrong way, could lead to potentially uncontrollable 
and in any case undesired consequences. Here, there is a transition from something termed 
delicate because it is protected, cut off from the outside world, to something termed delicate 
because of its connections to many points, thereby warranting such cutting off. Perhaps the 
same could be said of Hegung, which would then refer to the legal mechanism by which a 
conflict is limited so as to avoid its escalation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
satirical inscription . . . holds for men in general, or especially for heads of state who can never get enough 
of war, or perhaps only for philosophers who dream that sweet dream, is not for us to decide’. I. Kant, ‘To 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ in Perpetual Peace: And Other Essays on Politics, History, and 
Morals (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1983) 107 [343]. 
76 Grimm and Grimm, n 70 above, vol. 10, 101 and 815. 
77 F. Kluge, ‘Heikel’ in Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (Berlin/New York: Verlag Walter 
de Gruyter, 1975) 298. 
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The containment of conflict certainly appears to have been one of the aims in the 
bracketing of war,78 even if perhaps not in the sense commonly perceived. Hegung 
primarily protects what it delimits, and not its outside. This means that the containment of 
war cannot have been aimed at the protection of peaceful society; it must have been aimed 
at war itself. Something is gehegt not so that it may be neutralised, extinguished or 
expelled, but so that it may grow and be protected.79 
This protective sense of the term Hegung emerges when one considers limited war 
from another perspective. Schmitt follows Hobbes in regarding human nature as essentially 
fallible, and the state of nature as that state in which this fallibility can play out in the form 
of uncontained violence, the war of all against all. Taking the state of nature as a starting 
point, limited war becomes the realm of the political, ‘in which the effects of fallibility are 
contained and minimized’; ‘in which this violence can be contained, limited and redirected, 
but never abolished’.80 Containment, then, takes on precisely the opposite meaning to that 
first suggested. Rather than beginning with peaceful society and containing war for its 
benefit, the laws of war contain the state of 
78 This leads some commentators to simply translate Hegung with ‘containment’. See, for example, C. 
Mouffe, ‘Schmitt’s Vision of a Multipolar World Order’ (2005) 104:2 South Atlantic Quarterly 245, 249. 
79 Both Hobbes and Locke recognise the ‘hedging’ function of law, although they see law as protecting and 
 
enabling freedom rather than war. For Hobbes, law resembles a hedge in that it is intended ‘not to stop 
Travellers, but to keep them in the way’, while Locke defends law by saying: ‘[T]hat ill deserves the Name 
of Confinement which hedges us in only from Bogs and Precipices’. T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), XXX: 239-240 [182]. J. Locke, ‘The Second Treatise of Government: 
An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government’ in Two Treatises of 
Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: Hackett, 1988), 305 [§57]. 
80 Rasch, n 51 above, 97 and 99. 
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nature by erecting a ‘fence’ against it, bringing into being a new order within, which is then 
protected – in which inter-state war is then protected – from the violence of the state of 
nature.81 This protection achieves war’s ‘rationalisation, humanisation and legalisation’,82 
leading Schmitt to write about war in terms one would more readily expect as part of a 
description of legal order: 
 
 
Such wars are the opposite of disorder. They represent the highest form of order within the 
scope of human power. They are the only protection against a circle of increasing reprisals, 
i.e., against nihilistic hatred and reactions whose meaningless goal lies in mutual 
destruction.83 
 
 
The protective aspect of Hegung appears even more clearly when the term is 
considered in the meaning it acquired in the juridico-political sphere, where from the very 
beginnings of German legal history up until the 19th century it came to denote ‘the formal 
procedure of opening (court) assemblies’.84 According to Köbler, this procedure entailed 
 
81 Best, for example, writes that, ‘[s]o far as prisoners of war were concerned, its [the law’s] language 
indicates both a keen awareness that among the law’s classical purposes was the prevention of things being 
done in war which might hinder the return to peace, and an awareness that popular passions were actually 
pressing for the execution of such drastic and severer war measures as were sure to do that’. G. F. A. Best, 
Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1980), 156. 
82 Schmitt, n 8 above, 100. 
83 ibid, 187. 
84 G. Köbler, ‘Hegung’ in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann (eds) Handwörterbuch zur deutschen  
Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1978) vol. 2, 36. 
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the spatial delimitation of an area in which the dispute was to be heard by using branches 
or pegs around which rope was wound. For this, hazel branches were often used, as it was 
believed that they had magical powers that would protect from lightening and poisonous 
snakes, and grant fertility and virility.85 The person presiding over the assembly then asked 
whether it were now Dingtime, Ding (‘thing’) being the case brought or the matter of 
concern. Like Hegung, the word Ding was originally a Hegewort, i.e., a word that brackets 
or encloses. It meant ‘time’ in its Indo-Germanic form of origin and only through an 
association with the time for assembly came to denote first the assembly and later the 
dispute itself,86 its development thus describing a movement from the process of bracketing 
space to the bracketed space and finally its contents. 
The procedure also entailed the president’s demand for silence or peace. Such a 
demand is also associated with the concept of ‘ban’, the German word for which, Bann, is 
related to Hegung. If one disregards for a moment the meaning of Bann in modern (secular) 
language as ‘the authoritative [obrichkeitliche] order or prohibition issued under threat of 
punishment’,87 a meaning that can also be found in the verb verbannen (‘to banish, send 
into exile’) that Agamben links to the state of exception,88 then what emerges is a meaning 
in which Bann is inclusive rather than exclusive, gathering rather 
 
85 R. Schmidt-Wiegand, ‘Hasel’ in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann (eds) Handwörterbuch zur deutschen 
Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971) vol. 1, 2013-2015. 
86 E. Kaufmann, ‘Ding’ in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann (eds) Handwörterbuch zur deutschen 
 
Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971) vol. 1, 742-744. 
 
87 E. Kaufmann, ‘Bann, weltlich’ in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann (eds) Handwörterbuch zur deutschen 
Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971) vol. 1, 308. 
88 Agamben, n 5 above, 58. 
Page 30 of 36  
than expelling. In its original form, Bann meant either ‘emphatic, ceremonial speech’ or ‘to 
give a sign’,89 and only later acquired its sense of a prohibition via the meanings ‘proclaim 
with threats’ and ‘put a curse on’.90 As Kaufmann explains, the word bannen (‘to ban’) in 
its Proto-Germanic form referred to the formal proclamation of peace (Dingfriede) at the 
beginning of an assembly.91 Here, ceremonial speech acted as a sign; a sign that, even 
though it was set up against a certain type of enmity (in the same way in which the hazel 
was used to keep poisonous snakes away), served primarily as a threshold for an order 
within. In this order, it was not he who banned who took the place of the sovereign, but the 
ban itself.92 
89 Kaufmann, n 87 above, 308. 
90 J. Ayto, ‘ban’ in Dictionary of Word Origins, (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), 50-51. Ayto explains that  the 
meaning of the English word ‘ban’ also was originally one of proclamation rather  than prohibition: ‘The 
Germanic base *bann- was borrowed into Old French as the noun ban “proclamation”. From there it crossed 
into English . . .. It survives today in the plural form banns “proclamation of marriage”. The adjective derived 
from Old French ban was banal, acquired by English in the 18th century. It originally meant “of compulsory 
military service” (from the word’s basic sense of “summoning by proclamation”); this was gradually 
generalized through “open to everyone” to “commonplace”’. ibid. 
91 Kaufmann, n 87 above, 308. 
92 However, even where ‘ban’ was connected to a sovereign, its inclusive aspects are apparent, such as in the 
sovereign banner (Banner), which was used to communicate commands to soldiers in battle where voices 
could no longer be heard, thus gathering them together in concerted action, the phrase in seinen Bann ziehen 
(‘to cast a spell on someone’, or more literally, ‘to pull someone into one’s ban’) and in legal compounds of 
the word, such as Burgbann (‘castle ban’), which denoted the radius within which in Ottonian times 
inhabitants near a castle had both the right to flee into the castle when in danger and the duty to aid its 
construction. K. Kroeschell, ‘Bannmeile’ in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann (eds) Handwörterbuch zur deutschen 
Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971) vol. 1, 315-316. 
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The demand for silence or peace thus most closely relates to the protective aspect 
of Hegung. The necessity of such a demand, Köbler writes, should be regarded as self- 
evident for a time when the resolution of disputes was not yet undertaken by judges in court 
and depended on the ceasing of direct hostilities between the parties brought together.93 
Paradoxically, before any conflict could be articulated – before it could be heightened, 
brought to the point – it first had to be suspended. 
This suspension of the conflict was not a state of peace, but a forced silencing of 
the opposing parties. From the parties’ point of view, crossing over the threshold of silence 
meant crossing from unlimited to limited war. Within the threshold, war was no longer an 
action that could occur at any time, even at the same time as peaceful action, but a distinct, 
declared, and thus normalised94 state. The end of war was marked by another declaration, 
the threshold crossed once more. This time, peace lay on its other side. The threshold thus 
appeared to swap the descriptions of the two realms simply by being there; once the 
hostilities had been concluded, that which had originally been a realm of (unlimited) war, 
now became a realm of peace, while that which had been (relative) peace from the 
perspective of unlimited war, namely the limited war that took place within the threshold, 
appeared as an exception from peace in the first place. 
 
 
 
93 Köbler, n 84 above, 36-37. 
94 Rasch thus writes: ‘During the hiatus or transition period from universal Catholicism to universal 
(secularized) Protestantism – and Schmitt dates this period precisely, from 1713 to 1914 – a legal and 
diplomatic system develops which normalizes war, thereby limiting it, and normalizes the friend/enemy 
distinction, calibrating clearly defined friends and clearly defined enemies with clearly defined states of war 
and peace’. Rasch, n 51 above, 37, emphasis added. 
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In this way, peace began to appear as the more natural relation, to which war as a 
distinct dispute about certain matters of concern – the Ding or ‘thing’ – formed an 
exception.95 Peace, which for Schmitt was only ever the fragile outcome of pervasive 
antagonistic relations, came to be taken for granted. Its dependence on the careful 
protection of war was forgotten despite the fact that the mere possibility of peace had only 
arisen at the point at which the parties entered into limited war. By agreeing to spare each 
other’s existence despite their hostility, the parties acknowledged that it was possible, 
perhaps even necessary, to exist side by side in a plural order. Limited war thus had the 
effect of asserting society as an essentially peaceful plurality even when, or rather 
especially when, a dispute arose. War created and confirmed plural order as a presumed 
point of origin. 
This centrality of war to the order’s existence explains why Schmitt writes both 
about the single instance of war in Europe as ‘a regulated contest of forces gauged by 
witnesses in a bracketed space [in einem gehegten Raum]’96 and about Europe as a whole 
as this bracketed space: ‘In a certain sense, European soil became the theatre of war 
(theatrum belli), the enclosed space [der umhegte Raum] in which politically authorized 
 
95 Neff, for example, writes that the contractual school of thought on the laws of war held that ‘[r]elations 
during war were determined by the agreement made by the parties to lay aside their peaceful relations and 
resort to arms instead’. S. C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 138, emphasis added. Best writes: ‘The European law of war, it may once again be 
remarked, had its origins in a religious-based philosophy which exalted peace as the highest and most 
“natural” condition of humankind and reluctantly accepted war as no more than an occasional, unwelcome 
and discreditable incident of mortal frailty and wickedness’. Best, n 81 above, 129. 
96 Schmitt, n 8 above, 187, translation modified. 
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and militarily organized states could test their strength against one another under the 
watchful eyes of all European sovereigns’.97 By bracketing war, the laws of war encircled 
a space set aside for war, which then exceeded itself to include, and found on the basis of 
its own foundations, a larger space engulfing its outside. As Prozorov writes in relation to 
the friend-enemy distinction, the bracketing circle can be seen as ‘the founding event of a 
political community that subsequently recedes to its borderline as both exterior to its 
existence and indispensable for its formation’.98 And this is perhaps the most surprising 
aspect of the process of Hegung: By protecting war from society in the state of nature, 
Hegung reached back and behind this society to establish it as peaceful. 
Europe thus came to be defined by Hegung. War no longer simply happened; it was 
staged99 before a European audience, which it assembled as a collectivity of states, and 
which it ordered according to each state’s involvement in the hostilities. It is thus 
unsurprising that Trier, on whom Schmitt relies for tracing the origins of the word Hegung 
to cultic and religious ceremonies, finds that words denoting and belonging to Hegung 
made up the basis for the word ‘people’, even for the name of the Germanic people as the 
‘the people of our enclosure [Hegung], of our thing [unseres Dings]’.100 
 
 
 
97 ibid, 142. In another context, Schmitt writes about the ‘orbis of the same empire’ as that which determines 
the law applicable between its members, and this can be understood both as the ‘world’ created by spatial 
order and the ‘ring’ or ‘circle’ necessary to draw that order together into an order. ibid, 55. 
98 Prozorov, n 61 above, 223. 
99 The imagery of theatre is pervasive. Schmitt thus does not only refer to ‘theatres of war’, but also to the 
‘play of forces on the open stage’. Schmitt, n 7 above, 69-70. 
100 Schmitt, n 8 above, 244. 
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CONCLUSION: THE LAWS OF WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
 
When Schmitt wrote The Nomos of the Earth, he was able to choose from two alternative 
schemata for representing the role of law in international order. The first situates law 
between a constitutive force, such as concrete order, and a deciding sovereign. Here, law 
(Gesetz) is mere ‘mediation’;101 it has no direct, independent legal power and is incapable 
of defining the limits of its own application. The second regards law as universal. Order is 
like the space of Kantian reason – provisionally limited in its scope, but governed by law 
that is applicable universally, and therefore not only without a boundary (i.e., nothing that 
would require a decision), but also without the need for one.102 
Schmitt decided on the first schema, as he was against the idea of universal order. 
He thought that aspirations to universality merely served to justify continuous 
intervention103 – war in the name of peace, which he recognised for its potential to result 
in unlimited, interminable war. Schmitt thought that peace was possible only between 
concrete, separate entities, not within a universal, unified world order. Therefore, Europe 
needed a boundary, a sovereign drawing the line. 
As Europe did not have an overarching sovereign who could fulfil this role, Schmitt 
elevated concrete spatial order or nomos to the status of the sovereign. However, 
 
101 ibid, 73. The term ‘Mittelbarkeit’ is perhaps be better rendered as ‘indirectness’. 
102 ‘Boundaries (in extended things) always presuppose a space that is found outside a certain fixed location, 
and that encloses that location; limits require nothing of the kind, but are mere negations that affect a 
magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolute completeness’. I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) 103-104 [§57]. 
103 See, for example, Schmitt, n 4 above, 90. 
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in doing so, and in struggling to portray a measure of difference (i.e., nomos) as the unifying 
element of plural order, Schmitt actually described a third possible schema: An order in 
which law took the place of the sovereign, because law guaranteed this difference. 
In this schema, law was concrete, yet no longer subordinated to a sovereign 
decision. Its scope could have been extended to include other states, but never universally, 
as it had no ground that would elevate it to a universal norm. The resulting order was 
inwards-oriented, self-reverential in the sense that its only unity, the limitation of warfare 
between its elements, was based on the need to protect its plurality, while this plurality 
itself served no higher cause than the existence of the separate elements. In drawing the 
line between war that effectively regulated the order’s internal affairs (normality) and war 
that threatened that normality (exceptionality), law functioned as a boundary-drawing 
sovereign decision, while the sovereign decisions of states to go to  war functioned as the 
ordering mechanism of law. 
The effect of this reversal between law and decision was an emptying out, a 
postponement of sovereignty as meaning. The laws of war protected the continued 
possibility of war both from action that would reduce the number of elements within the 
order, and from a consensus that would reduce the potential for disagreement; from 
unlimited war, but also from a conception of justice. Schmitt called this order Hegung, an 
order in which war was protected and nourished as the best possible peace. The verb hegen 
or ‘hedge’ appropriately renders the sense of hedging that this ‘sovereign decision’ to 
protect war entailed: Rather than deciding now and hoping for the decision to prove itself 
right later, the laws of war postponed decisiveness as such – the decision to give 
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order a definitive meaning, to close it and thus eradicate the source of future possible 
disagreements. The laws of war had no vision of justice, no conception of fairness, no hope 
of consensus. They merely ensured that things should continue to happen, or perhaps, that 
things, radical disagreements, should continue to happen. 
 
